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	Value and Judgment in Investment 
Treaty Arbitration 
Frédéric Gilles Sourgens* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Are international treaties consenting to the resolution of disputes between for-
eign investors and the host states to their investment still a good idea?  Recent and 
not so recent criticism of such treaty provisions calls into question whether investor-
state tribunals can act as neutral arbiters of such disputes.1  This criticism argues 
that tribunals are biased in favor of the business interests of investors—and there-
fore disfavor the state’s right to regulate.2  Responses to this criticism frequently 
have alleged the opposite: The arbitral tribunals constituted under international trea-
ties are, if anything, too friendly towards the interests of states.3  They fail to protect 
the very economic interests of foreign investors that the treaties were designed to 
promote.4 
The temptation in such instances is to call for moderation.5  To recite an old 
adage—a decisionmaker is doing something right if both parties complain.  This 
moderation would counsel that if one only strips away the partisan veneer of dis-
course about investment treaty arbitration, one will find the state of affairs far im-
proved: arbitrators will be seen to act with independence, neutrality, and general 
predictability; these tribunals in other words will reflect the basic values of the rule 
                                                            
* Professor of Law & Director, Oil and Gas Law Center, Washburn University School of Law; Editor-
in-Chief, InvestmentClaims.com; Co-Chair, American Society of International Law Private International 
Law Interest Group.  I would like to thank Stacie Strong, Cindy Galway Buys, Milena Sterio, and Perry 
Bechky for the opportunity to participate in the ASIL-Missouri Works in Progress Conference.  I would 
also like to thank Bart L. Smit Duijzentkunst and Relja Radović for the vigorous discussion on interna-
tional dispute resolution.  Finally, thank you to the editors of the Journal of Dispute Resolution for in-
viting me to respond to Relja’s excellent contribution at the symposium, Inherently Unnetural Investe-
ment Treaty-Arbitration: The Formation of Decisive Arguments in Jurisdictional Determinations pub-
lished in this volume at 143. 
 1. Elizabeth Warren, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Clause Everyone Should Oppose, WASHINGTON 
POST (Feb. 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/kill-the-dispute-settlement-language-
in-the-trans-pacific-partnership/2015/02/25/ec7705a2-bd1e-11e4-b274-
e5209a3bc9a9_story.html?utm_term=.b5d319b75e15; GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY 
ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW (2007); 230 Law and Economics Professors Urge President Trump to 
Remove Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) From NAFTA and Other Pacts, Pub. Citizen (Oct. 
25, 2017), https://www.citizen.org/system/files/case_documents/isds-law-economics-professors-letter-
oct-2017_2.pdf. 
 2. See Warren, supra note 1; VAN HARTEN, supra note 1. 
 3. Todd Weiler, Remarks, in 10 INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 342, 
346 (Ian Laird, Borzu Sabahi, Frederic Sourgens & Todd Weiler eds. 2017) (“The proof lies in the arbi-
tral pudding, manifested in hundreds of tribunal decisions and awards the vast majority of which have 
evinced the adoption of a considered and scrupulously deferential posture towards all manner of im-
pugned measures”). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Ian Laird, Remarks, in INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW  347, 348-
351 (Ian Laird, Borzu Sabahi, Frederic Sourgens & Todd Weiler eds. 2017) (“we should provide a po-
sition which is much, perhaps more difficult to resist, which the moderate, middle, mushy position”). 
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of law by depoliticizing otherwise volatile disputes with significant geopolitical im-
plications. 
As Relja Radović’s apt deconstruction of the dialectic of decisionmaking in 
investor-state disputes shows, the institution of investor-state arbitration does not 
permit such calls for moderation.  In his Inherently Unneutral Investment Treaty:   
The Formation of Decisive Arguments in Jurisdictional Determinations, Radović 
concludes that conflicting ideals of legalism and teleology—dare one say, statism 
and liberalism—invade the very foundation of the jurisdiction of investor-state ar-
bitration tribunals.6  This realization is central: The problem is not how investment 
treaty tribunals decide, it is that they are given the power to decide, at all.7  To 
exercise jurisdiction is to participate in a broader juridico-political discourse – and 
to put its pragmatic needs of decision above all else.8 
Relja Radović explains that as arbitral tribunals constituted under international 
treaties grapple with their own mandate, they are torn between limiting their own 
jurisdiction (thus favoring the sovereign interest of the respondent state party to the 
treaty) or asserting their jurisdiction vigorously (thus favoring the economic inter-
ests of the claimant investor).9  He notes that they do so as a matter of necessity 
because neither view, restrictive or vigorous jurisdictional exercise of a mandate, 
can be preferred to the other in some form of infinite regress. 10  He further notes 
that because the very question of how jurisdiction should be viewed implies either 
perspective, there is no moderate middle ground that could be consistently de-
fended.11  But nor is ideological purity attainable – “[i]t is fairly odd to encounter 
examples of “total legalism” or “total teleology” among arbitral awards.”12  Prag-
matics, not ideology, drives decision. 
He concludes that this state of affairs reflects “realities that should be lived 
with, because they stem from the foundations of the international legal order, and 
are inherent to the system of international treaty arbitration.”13  Rather than impeach 
investor-state arbitration, he chides “endless demands for perfection” and calls on 
academics that “more efforts should be directed towards finding a way to live with 
such realities.”14 
What then are the realities in question?  What is their value?  And what is the 
kind of judgment that makes decisions in such a state of deconstructive flux?  I will 
seek to venture down the path Relja Radović has laid before us.  And I do so in the 
hope that a realistic view will ultimately prove both pragmatically and theoretically 
preferable to the metaphysical quest for perfection he rightly warns against. 
                                                            
 6. Relja Radović, Inherently Unneutral Investment Treaty Arbitration: The Formation of Decisive 
Arguments in Jurisdictional Determinations, 2018 J. DISP. RESOL. 143 (2018).  For a definition of liber-
alism and Statism, see Weiler, supra note 4, at 342. 
 7. Radović, supra note 6, at 179. 
 8. Id. at 181 (“In such a chaotic environment the question of the expression of teleological and le-
galistic approaches does not appear as “either—or,” but as “more or less.”  In other words, the issue at 
hand will dictate to what extent one or the other approach will be expressed.  There might be an imped-
iment for the expression of one of the two approaches to the extent that it becomes dominant one and 
serves as the basis of the decisive argument.   In such occasions, no matter the willingness of the arbi-
trators to pursue one or the other ideal, the lack of the opportunity to do so will limit their effect.”) 
 9. Id. at 153. 
 10. Id. at 145. 
 11. Id. at 174. 
 12. Id. at 180. 
 13. Id. at 183. 
 14. Id. 
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In doing so, I ultimately agree with Relja Radović: A problem arises when we 
see arbitral jurisdiction as justified by a belief that “truth is out there.”15  He submits 
that such a demand for truth would introduce requirements of consistency that, as 
he shows, can ultimately not be supported even within a single award.16  As he 
notes, “while legalistic [statist] decisive arguments find their substance in the foun-
dations of general international law and its basic concepts, teleological [liberal] de-
cisive arguments find their merits in the protect purpose of international investment 
law.  In both cases, they are formed outside the relevant treaty.”17  My suggestion 
is that, in thinking about the dialectic of decision-making in investor-state arbitra-
tion, we think not of truth in terms of an “out there.”  Rather, we should seek its 
meaning and value as if from within. 
II.  THE ISDS PARADIGM 
So first—what is “investment treaty arbitration?”  Investment treaty arbitration 
is a form of binding international dispute resolution.18  It permits certain foreign 
investors to file claims against host states.19  It obligates both host states and inves-
tors to abide by decisions of arbitral tribunals awarding damages or other available 
relief.20  The arbitration typically takes place before a three person panel composed 
of impartial and independent arbitrators chosen by the parties, or failing party agree-
ment, an international institution such as the World Bank or the President of the 
International Court of Justice.21 
There is no general right to Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS).22  In-
stead, investor-state tribunals are authorized to act only to extent that both the in-
vestor and the host state to the investment have given their consent.23  This consent 
can be given after the dispute has arisen.24  But it more typically is included in an 
earlier document such as a concession contract between the host state and the in-
vestor.25  International treaties are the most common source of ISDS state consent.26  
No matter how the consent is given, a host state’s ISDS consent is an international 
legal obligation.27 
                                                            
 15. Radović, supra note 6, at 171. 
 16. Id. at 181 (“Should an arbitrator refer to “the truth out there,” it is reasonable to assume the appli-
cation of that “truth” throughout the entire arbitral reasoning.  However, it is suggested, that is not the 
case.  What matters more are the needs and opportunities.”) 
 17. Id. at 179. 
 18. CHRISTOPHER DUGAN ET AL., INVESTOR STATE ARBITRATION 220 (2008). 
 19. See id. 
 20. See Edward Baldwin, Michael Nolan, & Mark Kantor, Limits to Enforcement of ICSID Awards, 2 
J. INT’L ARB. 1-24 (2006). 
 21. See DUGAN, supra note 15, at 128-29. 
 22. Frederic G. Sourgens, By Equal Contest of Arms: Jurisdictional Proof in Investor-State Arbitra-
tions, 37 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 875, 876 (2013). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Co. Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v. Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1, award (Feb. 17, 
2000). 
 25. World Duty Free Ltd. v. Kenya, ICSID Case No ARB/00/7, award (Sept. 25, 2006). 
 26. Int’l Centre Settlement Inv. Disp., The ICSID Caseload – Statistics (2015-2) at 7, https://ic-
sid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/resources/Documents/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202015-
2%20(English).pdf (“ICSID Statistics”). 
 27. FREDERIC GILLES SOURGENS, A NASCENT COMMON LAW 55-60 (2015). 
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The relevant bases for liability at issue in ISDS are set out in the consent doc-
uments.28  In a contractual proceeding, ISDS will determine whether one of the par-
ties to the contract owes damages to the other party for breach.  In the context of 
treaty arbitrations, the question typically concerns whether the state has violated 
one of the basic protections extended to foreign investors in the treaty—such as the 
promise not to expropriate investments without due process of law and against pay-
ment of just compensation.29 
ISDS has proved far from toothless: in one recent case, Russia was ordered to 
pay foreign investors in Yukos in excess of US$50 billion.30  It is thus hardly sur-
prising that investor-state arbitration continues to be popular with foreign investors 
judging by the continuously growing number of new claims filed each year.31 
The inclusion of ISDS consents in international investment agreements in prac-
tice has given foreign investors direct and immediate international legal rights 
against the host state of their investment.32  It is hard for states to modify or termi-
nate their ISDS consents without potentially running afoul of internationally-pro-
tected investor reliance interests or contractual rights.33  ISDS consents, in short, 
are not a cheap tool in the host state’s policy toolkit. 
III.  CRITIQUING THE ISDS PARADIGM 
Critics of ISDS submit that ISDS is not only expensive but also highly impru-
dent.  ISDS squarely places in issue the international lawfulness of sensitive policy 
questions such as the existence of effective means of asserting claims and enforcing 
rights in host state judicial institutions,34 or the propriety of plant phase-outs 
adopted as part of a broader nuclear policy.35    The only ones who appear to profit 
from ISDS, according to the critics, are powerful multinational companies who 
know how to exploit it and the lawyers who represent them.36 
The problem for both the critics and defenders of ISDS consents is that their 
focus is too narrow.  Critics assume that international economic relations could be 
more legitimately regulated in the absence of ISDS either through a modified free 
trade treaty system or by reliance wholesale upon sovereign rights to regulate.37  
Defenders of ISDS submit that the criticism of ISDS is misplaced as legitimacy 
                                                            
 28. See id. 
 29. ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 457 (2003). 
 30. Megan Davies, Jack Stubbs & Thomas Escritt, Court Orders Russia to Pay $50 Billion for Yukos 
Assets, REUTERS (July 28, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/29/us-russia-yukos-
idUSKBN0FW0TP20140729.  Nor are respondents fighting these awards taking investor-state awards 
“lying down.”  The same award has been set aside by a trial court in the Netherlands.  Daniella Strik, 
Georgios Fasfalis, Marc Krestin, Yukos Awards set Aside by The Hague District Court, KLUWER ARB. 
BLOG (Apr. 27, 2016), http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2016/04/27/yukos-awards-set-aside-
by-the-hague-district-court/. 
 31. ICSID Statistics, supra note 13, at 7. 
 32. SOURGENS, supra note 24, at 55-60. 
 33. Id. 
 34. White Indus. Aus. Ltd. v. Republic of India, Final Award in the Matter of an UNCITRAL Arbi-
tration (Nov. 30, 2011), Westlaw UNCITRAL Investor-State Claim. 
 35. Vattenfall vs. Germany: Nuclear Phase-Out Faces Billion Euro Lawsuit, DER SPIEGEL (Nov. 2, 
2011), http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/vattenfall-vs-germany-nuclear-phase-out-faces-
billion-euro-lawsuit-a-795466.html. 
 36. See Warren, supra note 1. 
 37. Id. 
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concerns raised by the critics address specific liability rules rather than ISDS as a 
means to enforce them; consequently, the focus should be upon improving these 
liability rules rather than railing against ISDS.38  Both positions do not, on their 
face, fully engage the points made by the other—both critics and defenders of ISDS 
deflect rather than discuss the problem of ISDS as such. 
As Relja Radović so cogently recognized, a meaningful discussion of invest-
ment treaty arbitration becomes possible only when we examine the legitimacy of 
ISDS consents themselves.39  The inclusion of strong ISDS consents sets up a dia-
lectic between different ideals of dispute resolution—statist and liberal, legalistic 
and teleological.40  Rather than focus upon casuistic polemics, it is this dynamic that 
largely determines the value (or lack thereof) of ISDS as a decision-making process 
in international law. 
This vision should cause us to pause and take stock of processes in international 
law more generally.  International law is no stranger to similar opposing forces.41  
This opposition frequently is framed in terms of a dialectic.42  Such a “dialectical 
character of all legal arrangements” leads to instability.43  Thus, “the moment a legal 
arrangement is struck, it coalesces latent opposing coalitions, who demand its ad-
justment, amendment or replacement.”44 The moment that this dialectic causes en-
gagement—creation and creative destruction within a normative field—it becomes 
dynamic.45  This dynamic harbors both vitality and significant dangers. 
Understanding this dynamic requires a repackaging of the critics’ polemics 
against ISDS.  As Relja Radović powerfully notes, the exercise of jurisdictional 
power by ISDS tribunals entails by its very invocation “risking the authority of their 
award.”46  What does this mean for consents to jurisdiction?  As W. Michael Reis-
man noted in a different context, consents may risk that “a State may not only lose 
its case, a risk which can be discounted beforehand, but presented with a decision 
going far beyond the downside risk which it had originally estimated.  The prospect 
of such a risk may outweigh the prospective advantages of resolving the dispute.”47  
The (lack of) authority of the award thus threatens the authority of consent instru-
ments: they are no longer means to yield predictable and anticipatable uses of power 
by international decision-makers.48 
                                                            
 38. See An open letter about investor-state dispute settlement, McGill (Apr. 2015), 
https://www.mcgill.ca/fortier-chair/isds-open-letter (“We respectfully submit that there are legitimate 
areas for meaningful debate about the substantive rights provided in investment treaties.”) (the author is 
a signatory to this letter). 
 39. Radović, supra note 6, at 171. 
 40. Id. 
 41. MARTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA 62-3 (2007). 
 42. ANTHONY CARTY, PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 31 (2007). 
 43. W. MICHAEL REISMAN, THE QUEST FOR WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY IN THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY: CONSTITUTIVE PROCESS AND INDIVIDUAL COMMITMENT 90 (2012). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Radović, supra note 6, at 149. 
 47. W. MICHAEL REISMAN, THE QUEST FOR WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY IN THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY: CONSTITUTIVE PROCESS AND INDIVIDUAL COMMITMENT 207 (2012). 
 48. HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYERS S. MCDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY, STUDIES 
IN LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY 26 (1992).  For a discussion, see Frederic G. Sourgens, The End of Law, 
39 FORDHAM INT’L L. REV. 355, 366 (2015). 
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This in turn poses a risk for effectiveness of legal decisions as such—”in a 
political system which lacks a sheriff, one of the contributions of the consent re-
quirement has been that it obviates enforcement virtually ensures compliance; each 
compliance with an international judgment helps to reinforce the law in dispute and, 
at the constitutive level, the effectiveness and legitimacy of international deci-
sion.”49  If ISDS causes states to renege on the enforcement of arbitral awards de-
spite their earlier consent to arbitrate, ISDS undercuts the value of international ju-
dicial and arbitral mechanisms as a whole. 
The problem therefore may be more threatening for ISDS than at first antici-
pated.  Certainly, it is true that “consensualism stubbornly persists.”50  The problem 
is that consensualism might just undercut its own authority: once given, consent can 
lead to wildly unpredictable results.51  This makes the granting of future consent 
less likely.52  It in fact risks corroding consent itself.  This would have far wider 
reaching implications for international law and international dispute resolution be-
yond the scope of ISDS. 
One need only look at Argentina and disputes arising out of the 2001 financial 
crisis to understand this dynamic.  Argentina gave advance consent to arbitrate in-
vestment disputes in a series of bilateral investment treaties in the late 1990s.53  Ar-
gentina’s hope in entering into these consents was to attract further foreign invest-
ment to Argentina.54  Argentina had offered significant other contractual incentives 
to attract investments—for instance, by promising payment of government obliga-
tions in U.S. dollar equivalent currency.55  Argentina shortly thereafter suffered a 
debilitating financial crisis that made it impossible to pay government obligations 
in the promised U.S. dollar equivalent currency leading to a devaluation of the peso 
and payment of obligations in newly devalued pesos. 56  Arbitrations ensued.57  Ar-
gentina invoked a defense of economic necessity—a defense essentially accepted 
by its dominant treaty partner, the United States—but rejected by a majority of 
                                                            
 49. REISMAN, supra note 40, at 213. 
 50. Radović, supra note 6, at 150. 
 51. See REISMAN, supra note 40. 
 52. For a discussion of the rollercoaster approach to investment arbitration clauses in treaty practice, 
see Edwina Kwan, Australia’s Conflicting Approach to ISDS: Where to From Here?, KLUWER ARB. 
BLOG (June 4, 2015), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2015/06/04/australias-conflicting-approach-to-
isds-where-to-from-here/. 
 53. Facundo Pérez-Aznar, Argentina Is Back in the BIT Negotiation Arena, INVESTMENTCLAIMS.COM 
(Nov. 14, 2016), http://oxia.ouplaw.com/page/argentina-bit. 
 54. See id. (discussing BITs part of conscious program of economic liberalization). 
 55. Jose E Alvarez & Kathryn Kamsi, The Argentine Crisis and Foreign Investors, A Glimpse into the 
Heart of the investment Regime, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY 
2008/2009 379, 387-89 (Karl Sauvant ed., 2009). 
 56. Id. at 389-90. 
 57. Id. at 390-91. 
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ISDS tribunals.58  In light of this inconsistency, Argentina has long refused to com-
ply with awards relating to disputes arising out of its financial crisis.59  This prece-
dent of non-payment can corrode the authority of ISDS and international legal de-
cision in general when used as a policy tool.60 
But this is not the end of the story.  Rather, we are witnessing a paradigmatic 
shift, a trans-nationalization of international law; the sovereign is being removed 
from its august position of sole rule on the international plane.61  It now must share 
this rule with many non-state actors central to the function of the world community 
as we know it today.  Not only that, conflicts between “states” and “human beings” 
are now being resolved against the state.62  Strong consents to dispute settlement 
between states and any of these non-state actors before an international body has 
tremendous importance to making this shift from a sovereign-centered to a sover-
eign-organized order legally cognizable.63  Without such consents, there would be 
no manner of resolving any conflicts against the state—and thus no manner to con-
tinue the trans-nationalization of legal decision-making processes. 
Relja Radović discusses this second competing aspect of the dialectic by refer-
ence to global public goods.64  These global public goods bestow a benefit to the 
international community as a whole.65  International governance, he submits, is re-
sponsible for advancing public goods globally, for instance, through human rights 
treaties.66  Investment protection—and consents to arbitrate investment treaty dis-
putes—similarly can be seen to constitute one such global public good.67  From this 
perspective: 
It has been suggested that international investment law satisfies the two 
basic characteristics of a public good, namely (i) non-rivalry, since its use 
by one party (an investor or a State) does not disturb its usage by others, 
and (ii) non-excludability, as it ultimately provides the benefit of facilitat-
ing capital flow and advancing economic growth (although its main archi-
tecture might associate to ‘club good,’ being available only to States sig-
natories to investment treaties.68 
I prefer a different, competing theory of the second prong of the dialectic—
though it ultimately may lead to practically similar results.  Many of the global 
                                                            
 58. Diane A. Desierto, The Modern International Law of Necessity with and Beyond Economics, A 
Response to Alan Sykes on Investment Treaty Making and Interpretation, 38 HOUSTON J. INT’L L. 715, 
745 (2016). 
 59. Tsai-yu Lin, Systemic Reflections on Argentina’s Non-Compliance with ICSID Arbitral Awards: 
A New Role of the Annulment Committee at Enforcement?, 5 CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 1-2 (2012). 
 60. See Public Statement on the International Investment Regime, OSGOOD HALL (Aug. 31, 2010), 
http://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/public-statement-international-investment-regime-31-august-2010/ (call-
ing on states to “refus[e] to pay arbitration awards against them where an award for compensation has 
followed from a good faith measure that was introduced for a legitimate purpose.”). 
 61. Frederic G. Sourgens, Functions of Freedom – Privacy, Autonomy, Dignity, and the Transnational 
Legal Process, 48 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 471 (2015). 
 62. REISMAN, supra note 40, at 267. 
 63. SOURGENS, supra note 24, at 57. 
 64. Radović, supra note 6, at 150. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
7
Sourgens: Value and Judgment in Investment Treaty Arbitration
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018
192 JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 2018 
mechanisms so inherent in contemporary world order broaden the scope of partici-
pants in prescription and in decisionmaking processes.  Individuals can press claims 
before human rights courts against states.  Investors can press claim before investor 
state tribunals.  The decisions rendered by human rights courts and investor-state 
tribunals themselves become the basis for future international prescription in a host 
of different areas.  In other words, the opening up of decision-making processes 
gives voice to an ever greater scope of those affected within society by sovereign, 
economic, financial, and industrial action.69  It provides means for a world civil 
society to assert its place more directly within transnational legal processes.  It also 
provides an accelerant and a catalyst for these processes to gain critical mass or 
cross a tipping point ultimately transforming means of participation in decision-
making for global civic actors. 
Both perspectives can explain why states cannot, and should not be able to, 
estimate potential costs and benefits of their consents.70  The process is no longer 
just about sovereign interests.  We expect international law to reach and protect 
beyond the sovereign, and to provide a “good” immediately to global civic actors.  
In fact, the highest “good” such a process can bestow upon world society is in-
creased participation.  If a public good is not seen through a contemporary regula-
tory lens, but through an ethical lens, the question is not what utility we generate 
for society.71  Rather, the question is what capability of human agency is im-
proved.72  A core capability remains that of being engaged, immediately, in the de-
cisions affecting one’s social and economic life.73  In the classic civic republicanism 
of Rome and the Renaissance, this good had a specific name—liberty.74 
Importantly, if one takes such a broader view, each legal instrument that in-
creases participation is good for world society as a whole, even if it does not imme-
diately increase economic development everywhere.  The point of the trans-nation-
alization of law is not just, or perhaps even principally, economic development.  
Rather, it is the transformation of law to better reflect the interests and needs of an 
ever greater number of civic participants. 
When we thus say with Relja Radović that we seek to “induce the relevant 
actors to shift from the traditional consensualism based thinking on the international 
legal order towards seeking to satisfy the ultimate objective that needs to be 
achieved,” we expect decision-making about these rights and protections to be ex-
tended beyond the naturally self-interested realm of sovereigns, as well.75  Strong 
consents to dispute settlement, as Relja Radović cogently explains, fundamentally 
support this goal.76  Without such consents, international law would fall short of our 
expectations that law ought to protect people, not legal fictions.  Without them, this 
means, international law would be somehow less authoritative because it would fail 
                                                            
 69. GRALF-PETER CALLIES & PEER ZUMBANSEN, ROUGH CONSENSUS AND RUNNING CODE 208-09 
(Hart Publishing, 2010). 
 70. REISMAN, supra note 40, at 207 (discussing the state-based cost-benefit analysis of consents to 
jurisdiction). 
 71. See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 17, 58-63 (1999) (discussing freedom as process 
and freedom as opportunity and discussing the limitations of utility). 
 72. AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 228-35 (The Belknap Press, 2009). 
 73. See id. 
 74. PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM, A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 36 (Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1999) (discussing the link between law, freedom and non-domination). 
 75. Radović, supra note 6, at 154. 
 76. Id. 
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to meet the normative expectations of world society.77  With less authority, interna-
tional law would need to spend more resources to control beyond sovereign-to-sov-
ereign relationships or risk becoming an afterthought in the policy toolkit of inter-
national relations and international commerce.78  Mere efficacy arguments thus do 
not suffice to justify narrowing ISDS consents. 
This dynamic or stress field cannot be “won” outright.  The critics’ point is that 
a slower pace would lead to a more sustainable international legal order; this slower 
pace would sacrifice ISDS on the altar of systemic change.  The defender of ISDS 
would point out that such a sacrifice gives up something reasonably central to the 
current international legal enterprise.  Both simply focus on different parts of the 
same process—protecting efficacy and protecting teleological integrity.  As Relja 
Radović would put it, the problem is ultimately that “legalistic and teleological de-
cisive arguments discussed here do lead to different outcomes, and they do so be-
cause they are caused outside the interpretive toolkit.”79  The toolkits are incom-
mensurate—and the dynamic of dialectic cannot be stayed or resolved. 
It is thus far from trivial for Relja Radović to encourage us to “[find] a way to 
live with such realities” that this dynamic will remain perennially unresolved.80  It 
should cause us to re-examine the goals we initially intended for ISDS and appraise 
whether ISDS actually meets these goals.81  In the context of such tension, ISDS 
practitioners should ask themselves: are ISDS consents worth defending?  Simply 
put, defending ISDS consents may well weaken the authority of the broader inter-
national legal enterprise; it would require more than a pure profit motive by those 
practicing in the field to defend.  This question thus asks less provocatively—what 
is the constitutive value behind strong ISDS consents?  It seeks to identify the 
broader good served by including ISDS consents for the integrity of international 
legal processes more generally that makes them worth the costs they doubtlessly 
entail. 
IV.  UNBUNDLING UNNEUTRALITY 
Both the unneutrality, to use Relja Radović’ apt turn of phrase, and the percep-
tion that investment treaty arbitrators trade in an endless regress of excuses imply 
that ultimately, investment treaty arbitration is ill-judged by some external yard-
stick.  Neutrality presumes that an object of study is susceptible to understanding 
according to a unitary measure.  It presumes what the Greeks thought classified as 
technē—”to make a systemic unity of disparate elements.”82  To be “un-neutral,” as 
opposed to being biased, thus simply denotes the absence of systemic unity.  In this 
case, it further implies its logical impossibility. 
An “endless excuse” invoked by Relja Radović comes to the same point.  As 
the Oxford English Dictionary notes, “excuse” is “the action of releasing a person 
from an obligation; a dispensation, release.”83  As the Oxford English Dictionary 
                                                            
 77. REISMAN, supra note 40, at 213. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Radović, supra note 6, at 172. 
 80. Id. at 183. 
 81. See REISMAN, supra note 40, at 90-91, 171, 176. 
 82. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS, LUCK AND ETHICS IN GREEK TRAGEDY 
AND PHILOSOPHY 95 (Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
 83. Excuse, Oxford English Dictionary (3d ed. 1884). 
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further explains in its etymology of the word, the obligation is a legal one: ex-causa, 
causa being an accusation or suit at law in Latin.84  Having migrated through old 
French to current English usage, an “excuse” thus is the attempt of seeking dispen-
sation from an external (legal) duty.85  In sum, Relja Radović’ appraisal leads us 
logically to conclude that no systemic unity of legal obligation can be theorized that 
could end arbitral regress. 
This result is not trivial given the normative conclusion that we are to “[find] a 
way to live with” the realities of investment treaty arbitration.  Relja Radović sug-
gests that these realities are bereft of truth—or more precisely that any quest for 
external truth or validation is doomed to fail.  At first blush, the article appears to 
proclaim the doom of legal practice and the futility of legal science. 
But there is another way.  The power of Relja Radović’ article is to demonstrate 
that midway upon the journey of our practice, we have found ourselves stumbling 
in the dark and at a loss for external reference to act as our guide.86  We therefore 
must change perspective.  Investment arbitration in this sense is a jurisgenerative 
process.87  It creates from within.88  Its guide is its own peculiar poetics.89  And it is 
this poetics, rather than a technē, that could make finding a way to live with the 
realities of the practice worthwhile. 
What then is the point of this “poetics”?  Let’s begin answering this question 
with a hypothetical—what if we resolved disputes in the absence of ISDS consents?  
In this hypothetical scenario, investors in transitional economies would be asked to 
present their disputes with the government in the host state’s nascent court systems 
with frequently little experience with either complex projects or judicial independ-
ence.  These courts are unlikely to give fast and effective relief. 
Given the stakes in many of these disputes, investors are unlikely to give in to 
their fate.  Rather, the investor is systemically encouraged to turn to its home state 
for aid.  This aid could both “expedite” host state judicial processes or “incentivize” 
extra-judicial settlement. 
But the home state is unlikely to act altruistically.  It is far more likely to use 
the investor-state dispute as part of its broader foreign policy interests and use the 
investor-state dispute as additional leverage in geopolitical bargains.  The effective 
decisions of this process would make a myth of any international regime for the 
protection of investments, property of aliens, or corporate responsibility of multi-
nationals.  Such decisions are opaque, at home in the realm of “secret” diplomacy, 
and highly unlikely to comport with the authoritative expectations of most members 
                                                            
 84. Excuse, Oxford English Dictionary (“[ME. Escusen, excusen, ad OF escuser, excuser, ad L. ex-
cusarare, f. ex- (see Ex- pref.) + causa CAUSE, accusation]”). 
 85. Id. 
 86. See DANTE, INFERNO: THE LONGFELLOW TRANSLATION 1 (Modern Library, 2003) (“Midway 
upon the journey of our life/ I found myself Within a forest dark/ For the straightforward pathway had 
been lost.”). 
 87. See Frederic G. Sourgens, Reconstructing International Law as Common Law, 47 Geo. Wash. 
Int’l L. Rev. 1 (2015). 
 88. Id. at 46. 
 89. See DANTE, supra note 83, at 2-3 (Dante’s guide through inferno is Virgil, the poet).  Poetics here 
is also intended as referencing the scholarship surrounding autopoeisis.  For this scholarship, see partic-
ularly GUNTHER TEUBNER, CONSTITUTIONAL FRAGMENTS (2012).  I view poetics not as operating 
within autopoeitic systems.  Rather, I view poetics as process independently of systemic constraints.  See 
Sourgens, supra note 84, at 45-47; see also NUSSBAUM, supra note 79, at 79-82 (discussing poetic dis-
course as yielding in the context of Antigone). 
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of the world community.  In short, they are more likely to support an operational 
code that is “profoundly dysfunctional,” corrupting and corrupt.90 
The corrupting influence of such profoundly dysfunctional codes is particularly 
present in the context of investments.  Investment arbitration deals with very real 
assets having a sizable influence on the economic capabilities of the host state.  The 
confluence of cash and capabilities creates conduits for sizable corruption—if not 
one of the most significant pressure points through which to achieve it.  Leaving 
investment protection to this dysfunctional operational code thus harbors serious 
risks. 
As the move to trans-nationalized international law continues, a key goal—and 
a key goal supported by ISDS—is to limit the role of such non-transparent and dys-
functional operational codes on the sovereign-to-sovereign level.  Say what one 
might about ISDS awards, they are public.91  They are reasoned.92  They are open 
to academic and public scrutiny.93  They present less risks of supporting profoundly 
dysfunctional operational codes than the alternative. 
What is more, the ISDS process precisely permits not only the parties to the 
dispute but also NGOs and other civil society participants to voice their views as 
part of the decision-making process through amicus curiae submissions.94  These 
voices would not have had a prayer at relief in our alternative world—even or pre-
cisely in the context of momentous decisions for the host state, the region, and its 
citizens. 
This leaves the question—why arbitration?  Professor Reisman correctly la-
ments that “paradoxically, rational responses to [our] increasingly ‘global’ condi-
tion always seems to require and involve the creation of more alliances and more 
transnational governmental structures, which in turn further minimize the opportu-
nities for individual agency in the policy decisions affecting one’s life.”95  Arbitra-
tion by and large is the least structurally complex mode of decision-making capable 
of supporting necessary agency (courts by and large are more complex animals than 
ad hoc arbitral tribunals and less flexible in addressing new realities and global ad-
ministrative agencies are less flexible still than courts).  Applying Ockham’s razor, 
as the simplest, most flexible way to achieve the larger constitutive goals we have 
in mind for ISDS, we should stick with it.  We should identify and attempt to fix 
problems within this means for dispute settlement before we attempt a wholesale 
exercise in novel institutional design.  This is no easy feat—but given the flexibility 
of arbitration, it nevertheless appears to be an eminently achievable task. 
Pace the mounting criticism against investor-state dispute settlement, there are 
strong structural reasons to support ISDS precisely because of its unneutrality.  
Counter-intuitively, the constitutive value of ISDS, including its unneutrality, is the 
opening-up of previously hidden operational codes of frequently quasi-colonial Re-
alpolitik and their replacement with decisions subject to public scrutiny, rational 
                                                            
 90. See REISMAN, supra note 40, at 101. 
 91. See generally OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, http://oxia.ouplaw.com/home/ic (Sept. 12, 2017). 
 92. See GUILLERMO AGUILAR ALVAREZ & W. MICHAEL REISMAN EDS., THE REASONS REQUIREMENT 
IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: CRITICAL CASE STUDIES (Brill Academic Publishers, 
2008). 
 93. See Frederic G. Sourgens, Law’s Laboratory: Developing International Law on Investment Pro-
tection as Common Law, 34 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 181 (2014). 
 94. Andrea K. Bjorklund, The Emerging Civilization of Investment Arbitration, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 
1269, 1290-94 (2009). 
 95. REISMAN, supra note 40, at 76. 
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engagement, and authoritative account.96  This rational engagement is driven by 
conflict—conflicting narratives and values.  Poetics suggest that this conflict can 
be brought to a resolution because of our ability to yield, simultaneously, to both 
value sets, to both narratives.  Investor-state arbitration demonstrates such a cross-
weaving of the teleological and legalistic concerns in almost every single decision.  
In the end, decisions are justified in terms of the prevailing discourse—yet the dis-
course itself is somewhat changed by the engagement. 
Poetics in this sense operate much in the way of translation.  As a leading the-
orist of translation notes: 
Each differentiation entails its own dynamic of internal regrouping, even 
as each frontier zone between nations has its own special character of ex-
aggerated national assertion and, at the same time, of amalgam with ele-
ments over the border (hence the questions regarding the internal topology 
of the multilingual).  The difference of English from French for the French-
speaker, of French from English for the English-speaker—the terms can 
cross over on either side of the equation, being the reverse and observe of 
the diacritical contact—is at every linguistic point so dense and plural as 
to deny formal description.97 
The engagement between different theories of consent operates in much the 
same way as proponents of the opposing teleological and legalistic views engage 
each other.  To decide, they ultimately translate their respective points into their 
own idiom.  In doing so, they deny formal description, neutral measure, or common 
axiom as the two are precisely incommensurate as Relja Radović has shown.  But 
their engagement leaves each changed precisely because the act of translation amal-
gamates and reincorporates within the home idiom. 
Understanding why we should live within our realities despite the open incom-
mensurabilities they contain, in other words, is to understand that to advocate oth-
erwise is to fall for a dangerous myth.  It would be to fall for the lure of the mono-
lingual that the world would just be simpler if we all spoke the same language.  The 
statist would thus intone that without arbitral oversight, investors, host states, and 
home states would not dare to play politics with very sizable and geopolitically 
sensitive investment, but submit to transparent and efficacious domestic judicial 
processes.98  Historical evidence strongly suggests that belief in this myth has less 
footing in reality than a belief in Santa Claus.  And it is a myth that is on the whole 
more geopolitically pernicious: Each state would insist upon the validity of its own 
interest, its own idiom over the other.  By denying space for transnational normative 
translation through international dispute resolution mechanisms such as ISDS, in 
other words, we set up the play for global colonialist conquests.  Though always 
justified by reference to some “truth” out there to be vindicated, that reality is on 
the whole bleaker than the one with which we currently live. 
                                                            
 96. W. Michael Reisman, Myth Systems and Operational Code, 3 YALE STUD. WORLD PUB. ORD. 
229, 231 (1977) (defining operational codes as “the way things are actually done by key official or 
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